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Why should a bank robber in California get a differentsentence than a bank robber in Texas? This was therallying cry behind the legislative implementation
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  The Senate Judiciary
Committee found that a major source of the astounding varia-
tions in federal sentencing for identical crimes was the “judge
factor.”1 Federal judges had the discretion to select a sentence
from anywhere within a broad statutory range for each offense.
The judge had the sole responsibility of assessing each indi-
vidual offender and deciding where, within that broad range,
the offender should receive a sentence.  As a result, sentences
issued for the same offense differed dramatically, depending on
the judge who handed down the sentence.
The congressional response to the dilemma of disparate sen-
tencing was the enactment of the Sentencing Guidelines
Reform Act of 1984.2 The legislation passed 85 to 3 in the
Senate and 316 to 91 in the House of Representatives.3 The
broad bipartisan support for the Act suggests that the objective
of eliminating unwarranted judicial sentencing disparity was
an admirable and respectable goal that encompassed the con-
cerns of the nation as a whole.  
The Act provided for the creation of the United States
Sentencing Commission, a novel federal rule-making agency.
The Sentencing Commission was charged with the develop-
ment of a sentencing range for each class of convicted persons
based both on the offense and the offender.  The Sentencing
Commission accomplished this task with the establishment of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, a set of guiding principles
that were expected to promote a more deliberate, fair, and
rational sentencing process than had previously existed in fed-
eral sentencing.4 The “judge factor” was, thus, narrowly con-
fined as the range of possible sentences was strictly defined
and allowed for very little judicial discretion. 
As stated earlier, the proclaimed goal of the Guidelines was
to eliminate disparity and create truth in sentencing.  It was
not intended to serve as a cure-all to every judicial inequality
that lies within the criminal justice system.  Supporters of the
Sentencing Commission and the Guidelines, however, may
have naively assumed that such a miraculous judicial recon-
struction would be a natural consequence of the 1984 enact-
ment.  The system of rules and procedure even lends an
appearance of having been constructed on the basis of service
and technocratic expertise, giving it a threshold credibility to a
general public not familiar with its actual contours and opera-
tion.5 In reality, a new and equally devastating sentencing dis-
parity has evolved with the implementation of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, which can no longer be attributed to
the “judge factor.”  
Though originally created to produce a more equitable sen-
tencing scheme, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have had
the opposite effect and become a major source of societal per-
petration of racial inequality.  The question that originally
sparked legislative outrage and subsequent action in the realm
of federal sentencing has been answered:  Why should a bank
robber in California get a different sentence than a bank robber in
Texas?  He shouldn’t! A new question has arisen under the
Guidelines, however, one that demands a response:  Why
should a black drug offender in America receive a different sen-
tence than a white drug offender?
I. HOW THE GUIDELINES WORK
Federal judges are statutorily required to sentence defen-
dants according to the Sentencing Guidelines.  A typical case is
governed by the sentencing table, which prescribes sentencing
ranges in months of imprisonment.  A sentence is derived by
intersecting the offender’s criminal history and the level of the
offense.  Federal judges must now engage in complex numeri-
cal calculations before imposing a sentence under the
Guidelines.6 Chapter three of the Guidelines allows for judi-
cial adjustments to the base level for certain aggravating or
mitigating circumstances, such as victim impact, the offender’s
role in the offense, obstruction, multiple counts, and the
offender’s acceptance of responsibility.7
Following a guilty verdict or plea, a United States probation
officer will conduct an independent pre-sentence investigation
of a defendant and issue a Pre-Sentence Report (PSR) to aid the
court in a sentence determination.  The PSR is also provided to
the Assistant U.S. Attorney prior to sentencing and any objec-
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tions concerning factual disputes and applicable Guidelines
issues must be resolved between the two government agents
before a final PSR is given to the court.8 Also, a sentencing
court is required to consider “all acts and omissions . . . that
were part of the same course of conduct or common scheme or
plan as the offense of  conviction.”9 This designation includes
conduct that was not formally charged, as well as offense con-
duct that was charged in the indictment, but for which the
defendant was actually acquitted.   
Another major consequence of the enactment of the
Sentencing Reform Act is the evolution of mandatory mini-
mum sentences.  These sentences can greatly affect the sen-
tence imposed on a defendant.  Congress has set mandatory
minimum sentences for more than 100 crimes.10 In practice,
only four statutes are used with any type of regularity, all cov-
ering drug and weapon offenses.11 These four statutes appear
to be responsible for 94% of all federal mandatory minimum
cases.12 Mandatory sentences require offenders to serve their
entire sentence without parole.  “Mandatory minimum sen-
tences trump the guideline ranges.”13 Where the sentencing
table places the low end of the sentencing range below the
mandatory minimum, the court must follow the mandatory
minimum sentence.  Unless the government moves to depart
below the statutory mandatory minimum, the court has no
authority to do so.  
II. THE PROBLEM
There is great irony in the fact that the original, motivating
purpose behind sentencing reform was the elimination of dis-
criminatory “disparity” in sentencing, yet racial and class
inequalities in sentencing under the Guidelines persist.  The
Guidelines have, in a sense, created a bifurcation of society
between “We the people” and “We the other people.”16 The
sentencing reformers of the 1984 Congress attempted to ratio-
nally and reasonably solve an imperative governmental prob-
lem, but like the civil-rights hydra of the 1950s, many more
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ILLUSTRATION 1
Defendant, Jamaal, pled guilty under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11(e)(1)(B) to two counts pursuant to a
plea agreement: conspiracy to possess crack with intent to dis-
tribute, involving over 500 grams of crack cocaine; and distri-
bution of crack.  
In preparing the PSR, the probation officer first computes
the base offense level predicated on the offense conduct
described by the Assistant U.S. Attorney.  The base offense
level is 36 because Jamaal possessed over 500 grams of crack
with the intent to distribute, and there are no specific aggra-
vating offense characteristics, such as possession of a firearm,
to factor in.  Then the probation officer has to determine
whether any other adjustments are mandated under the five
sub-parts of chapter three of the Act: (A) victim-related adjust-
ments; (B) role in the offense; (C) obstruction of justice; (D)
multiple counts; and (E) acceptance of responsibility.  In
Jamaal’s case, there are no adjustments to be made.  Because
Jamaal pled guilty he receives a three-level downward adjust-
ment for acceptance of responsibility, so his total offense level
is 33.
Jamaal’s criminal history category is I, because he has no
prior convictions.  Looking at the sentencing grid, which has
criminal history categories along one axis and the offense lev-
els along the other, a judge must conclude that for an offense
level of 33 and a criminal history of I, the sentencing range is
135-168 months (approximately 11 to 14 years).14
ILLUSTRATION 2
Defendant, Johnnie, also pled guilty under Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11(e)(1)(B) to three counts pursuant to a
plea agreement: conspiracy to import cocaine, involving more
than 500 grams of cocaine; conspiracy to possess cocaine with
an intent to distribute; and distribution of cocaine.  
In Johnnie’s case, the base level at which the probation offi-
cer will arrive at for conspiracy to import more than 500 grams
of cocaine is 26.  Once again, no specific offense characteris-
tics are present.  In the “adjustments” stage of the process,
however, the probation officer will adjust the base offense level
with a three-level increase for the role Johnnie played in the
offense, pursuant to Guidelines section 3B1.1(b), because he
was a was a manager or supervisor of a criminal activity, which
was otherwise extensive, and reaches a subtotal of 29.
However, because Johnnie also pled guilty he receives a three-
level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility, so
his total offense level remains at 26.
Johnnie’s criminal history category is II, because he has
three prior convictions.  Looking at the sentencing grid crim-
inal history axis and cross referencing that number with the
offense level axis, a judge must conclude that for an offense
level of 26 and a criminal history of II, the sentencing range is
70-87 months (approximately 5 to 7 years).15
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sentencing problems have
come forth to take the place
of judicial disparity.
A. Incarceration and
Prosecutorial Sentencing
The figures boasted by the
United States on current per
capita incarceration rate sta-
tistical charts are astound-
ingly high.17 Billions of dol-
lars have been and are being
diverted from educational programs to pay the costs of build-
ing and operating a burgeoning number of prisons and jails.18
The United States has seen an explosion in numbers of federal
offenders and an enormous financial burden has been placed
on taxpayers.  Judges find the fact that judicial power has been
totally shifted and now lies in the hands of aggressive prosecu-
tors to be a “scary notion” because prosecutors are hired with-
out the careful scrutiny given to federal judges.19 As a result,
federal judges frequently find themselves imposing sentences
that they wholly disagree with and feel are unjust.20
A fundamental United States principle, illustrated by the
founding fathers’ implementation of a system of checks and
balances, is that it is unwise to leave such power “unchecked
in the hands of anyone, least of all in the hands of men and
women whose decisions are made in the privacy of their
offices, who are caught up in an adversarial role, and whose
public function often serves as a stepping stone to higher polit-
ical or judicial office.”21 In an intense critique of the
Guidelines, Judge J. Lawrence Irving of San Diego commented
upon his retirement, “If I remain on the bench, I have no
choice but to follow the law.  I just can’t, in good conscience,
continue to do this.”22
B. Racial Disparity
One major dilemma that has arisen and continues to tear at
the social fabric of whole communities is the racial disparity
perpetrated under the use of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines.
The percentage of black men in both state and federal prison is
considerably higher than that of white men, even though blacks
are only 12% of the male population.23 Statistics show that, on
any given day, one in three black men aged 20 to 29 is in prison
or jail, on probation, or on parole.24 Thus, there are more
young black men in prison than there are in colleges across this
nation.25 Governmental statistics show that black people rep-
resent about 14% of the nation’s drug users, yet make up 35%
of those arrested for drug possession, 55% of those convicted
for drug possession, and 74% of those sentenced to serve
time.26 A recent report indicated that young Hispanic males
have a one in six chance of spending time in prison.27 In fact,
the percentage of federal Hispanic prisoners grew 219%
between 1985 and 1995, making Hispanics the fastest growing
category of prisoners.28 The percentage of federal Asian
American prisoners also increased by a factor of four between
1980 to 1999.29 Federal drug sentencing in the U.S. appears to
purport a lofty goal of disparity elimination while, at the same
time, creating yet another head on the hydra of racial injustice.
C. Perpetration of Racial Discrimination
The Guidelines have also served as an indirect source of the
perpetration of racial discrimination in other areas.  As young
African-Americans continue to be disproportionately sen-
tenced, the perception that most African-Americans are
deviant and serve as the primary source of crime in this coun-
try becomes more prevalent in the mind of the white majority.
In reality, whites commit drug crimes, too, but police enforce-
ment strategies do not focus on white neighborhoods.30 Drug
arrests are simply easier to accomplish in impoverished inner-
city neighborhoods than in stable middle-class neighborhoods. 
It has been said that simply to make it through the day,
blacks pay a psychic tax.31 Members of all classes of African-
Americans, middle-class, working-class, and the poverty-
stricken, often and perhaps increasingly agree on this point.
When you see a fellow black man get stopped by the police,
you wonder how race figured into it.  When you go into a store
and the sales people give you an extra bit of scrutiny, you won-
der.  When you’re on an elevator and it stops at a floor and the
white woman waiting moves to another elevator, your first
thought is race.32 Little things such as these remind the
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African-American community that, as a black person, you are
paying your “black tax.”33
Yet another tragic consequence of the disparity created by
the Guidelines is the devastation of inner-city communities, in
which family serves as the core foundation.  These communi-
ties are predominately minority-populated.  The disproportion-
ate sentencing scheme has been referred to as the “warehous-
ing” of the sons and daughters of minority communities.34
This warehousing merely postpones the confrontation of a
much more serious problem:
When we put an 18-year-old minority youth in the
federal penitentiary for 10 years for possessing 50
grams of crack, we assure our society of having to deal
with a 28-year-old far less able to be productive in a
society that has progressed in the 10 years, while he
was warehoused in the penitentiary.  Welcome to our
next nightmare.  What do we then do with the 28-
year-old less equipped to lead a productive life in this
society than he was at the age of 18?  How many
prison building campaigns can America afford to
endure?  And how many thousands of minorities can
we afford to incarcerate before we admit that this dis-
parity is directed at the heart and soul of our commu-
nities: our youth.35
It has been theorized that the ultimate effect of warehousing,
yet to be realized, is a “raging epidemic of poor, dumb chil-
dren.”36 Irony lies in that fact that the United States boasts a
label of the richest, most educated nation on earth.  This epi-
demic and these children can be ignored for now, however,
because they lack the power associated with constituency.  
D. The War on Drugs
While facially neutral, the Guidelines contribute to contin-
ued racial discrimination in various insidious ways.  This per-
petuation is often carried out under the guise of America’s “War
on Drugs.”  It was under this guise that the base offense levels
for various categories of drugs were set and the Anti-Drug
Abuse Act of 1986 was passed.37 Driven by the media-manu-
factured notion that crack cocaine would lead to the ruin of
society, the legislature and its bureaucratic counterparts
adopted the view that crack was far more dangerous than pow-
dered cocaine.38 During this time, Americans (constituents)
cringed at the thought of becoming victims of random, irra-
tional assaults and the fear
and frustration of the aver-
age citizen had grown to a
level of anticipated “lynch
mob mentality,” which
became the common emo-
tional reaction to crime.39
The legislature accepted as
fact the contention that
crack does more harm to the
body than powdered
cocaine and does so faster.
Also, the legislature concluded that crack is more readily avail-
able than powdered cocaine and that its cheaper price makes it
more rampant throughout society.  This heightened view of
crack as an epidemic that necessitated immediate action also
came as a result of the crack overdose of 22-year-old, first
round NBA draft pick, Len Bias, and the death of Cleveland
Browns’ safety Don Rogers.40
Subsequently, all committee work on the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act was completed in five weeks.41 The legislative history of
the 1986 Act is full of racially tinged references to ghettos and
dealers of different ethnicities.42 For example, the following
statement was made on the Senate floor in support of the leg-
islation’s passage: “For the growing numbers of the white mid-
dle class who have become hooked on cocaine rock, buying
the drug can be like stepping into a foreign culture.”43
Certain members of Congress did express concern at the
fast-paced passage of the Act.  Representative Frenzel observed
that the bill was “clumsy” and “put together in the style of a
Great Society Program, as its hallmarks were lack of coordina-
tion, incomplete consideration, and misunderstood compro-
mises.”44 Senator Evans labeled the speedy legislative process
a “sanctimonious election stampede,” which trampled the
Constitution.45 In his opinion, the actions of Congress with
regard to the Anti-Drug Abuse Act resembled a lynch mob, as
opposed to a legislature concerned with careful deliberation
and implementation.46 Senator Mathias also cautioned that
sometimes “in our haste to do something about a serious prob-
lem, we create a whole new array of problems.”47
Despite these objections and the fact that crime proposals
should be considered in a deliberate fashion, without giving in
to ineffective, tough-sounding non-solutions, the bill easily
passed through Congress without regard to usual legislative
procedures.  The legislation merely provided a band-aid
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approach to crime, rather than
treating its root causes.  However,
no political party wished to be
labeled soft on crime in a nation
preoccupied with crime and its
proposed remedies.  The provi-
sions of the Act were then incor-
porated into the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines.  
The war on drugs has since
proven to be an abysmal failure.  The effort consumes more
than an estimated $75 billion per year of public money; exacts
an estimated $70 billion a year from consumers; is responsible
for nearly 50% of the millions of Americans who are currently
in jail; occupies an estimated 50% of the trial time of our judi-
ciary; and devours the time of over 400,000 police officers.48
Within the usage of a wartime metaphor, casualties are at
hand—in this war, “we continue to inflict casualties upon our-
selves.”49 The war on drugs is targeted almost exclusively at
inner-city communities and it basically serves as a war on
young, highly visible, and wholly replaceable African-
American street dealers.  The provisions created by the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act, however, are still in effect and continue to
manufacture chaos.
These provisions created a 100-to-1 ratio between crack and
powder cocaine.50 A defendant convicted of selling 100 grams
of  powdered cocaine has committed a level 18 offense and may
be sentenced to 27 to 33 months.  In contrast, a defendant sell-
ing one gram of crack cocaine will also find himself at a level 18
offense and will be subject to the same sentence, assuming both
have no prior convictions.51 A person would have to possess
500 grams of powdered cocaine to receive the same sentence as
someone found in possession of 5 grams of crack and 5,000
grams of powdered cocaine to receive a sentence equal to some-
one found in possession of 50 grams of crack.52 Ironically, 5
grams of crack can create approximately 10 to 50 doses of the
drug and may sell for an average retail price of $225 to $750
dollars.53 Five hundred grams of powdered cocaine, however,
represents anywhere from  2,500 to 5,000 doses and can sell for
approximately $32,500 to $50,000.54 The dosages and prices
are dependent on the process used to manufacture and weigh
the drug and the available market.55
Crack cocaine, however, has not sufficiently been proven
more harmful than powder cocaine.  Crack and powdered
cocaine are essentially the same substance.  Cocaine is a prod-
uct that occurs freely in nature in the coca leaf and is the basic
building block of other cocaine compounds.  Cocaine’s molec-
ular formula is C17 H21 N4, it has a molecular weight of 303,
and it has a melting point of 98 degrees Centigrade.56
Powdered cocaine is a salt-containing hydrochloric acid,
which is inhaled through the nose.57 Crack is made up of pow-
dered cocaine mixed with baking soda and water, which is
then heated and hardened and broken into small pieces that
are sold as rocks that are smoked in a glass pipe.58 DEA
chemists define crack simply as a “lumpy” substance contain-
ing cocaine and bicarbonate of soda.59 There is no evidence
that the “lumpiness” contributes anything to the potential for
abuse, and, of course, other forms of cocaine and its salts and
isomers can also appear in lumpy forms unless they are milled
into fine particles.60
Though the Guidelines do not distinguish between white
and black defendants, sociologists and criminologists will ver-
ify that use and distribution patterns for crack closely track
inner-city ethnic and racial lines.61 Crack is cheaper than pow-
dered cocaine and is easier to break down and package into
small quantities for distribution.  It is, therefore, prevalent in
the inner cities, where minorities are substantially represented
within the population.  
“No one is suggesting that the street dealer is innocent,”
noted U.S. Representative John Conyers, Jr., “he is not.  But
neither is he the one flying planes to Colombia bringing back
million-dollar cargoes.”62 Since high-level dealers and drug
wholesalers are more likely to handle powdered cocaine, it
makes no sense to give them far lighter sentences than crack
peddlers.63 Peripheral agents of drug kingpins are receiving
disproportionately harsh sentences.  This agent is paid approx-
imately $200 dollars by a drug trafficker for manufacturing
and transporting 50 grams of crack from one city to another
and is subject to a mandatory 10-year sentence, which could
quite possibly be a more substantial sentence than the traf-
ficker who controls the drug organization and will receive the
bulk of the profit, but deals only with powdered cocaine.64 In
a district court decision that has since been reversed, Judge
Clyde Cahill stated that the disproportionate ratio has “created
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a situation that reeks with inhumanity and injustice.”65 Judge
Cahill worried that the scales of justice had been turned and
twisted so that the drug trafficking kingpins, the masterminds,
escape detection, while those who play a trivial role are
“hoisted on the spears of an enraged electorate and at the pin-
nacle of their youth are imprisoned for years while those most
responsible for the evil of the day remain free.”66 The war on
drugs has been referred to as the reincarnation of Jim Crow
laws.67 It would seem to be not only logical, but economically
sensible to devote scarce government resources to reducing the
large ingress and wholesale distribution of powder cocaine by
major traffickers, which would consequently reduce the exis-
tence of crack as a derivative product.  Without cocaine, there
would be no crack.  
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES 
“Sadly, . . . one wonders whether the majority [of the court]
still believes that . . . race discrimination against non-whites is
a problem in our society, or even remembers that it ever was.”68
Justice Harlan first introduced the idea of a color-blind
Constitution in a 1896 dissent from the Supreme Court deci-
sion regarding Plessy v. Ferguson.69 Unfortunately, in the year
2001, blacks were roughly eight times as likely to end up in jail
as whites and the very notion of color-blind justice remains
endangered.70 Danger lies in the absence of the kinds of com-
mon cultural commitments and shared values that are crucial
to holding any society together.  The extraordinarily difficult
task confronting the Supreme Court lies in crafting a concept
of justice that recognizes a policy-level need for the acknowl-
edgment of racial differences where necessary to overcome
biased practices still in existence.71
A. Excessive Delegation and Separation of Powers
Certain challenges to the constitutionality of the Guidelines
revolve around the Sentencing Commission itself.  The
Commission consists of seven voting members and one non-
voting member.72 The President appoints the voting members,
at least three of whom must be federal judges.73 The three
judges are selected from a list of six judges recommended to
the President by the Judicial Conference of the United States.74
The commissioners are subject to removal by the President for
“neglect of duty or malfeasance in office or for other good
cause shown.”75 Two claims generally raised by defendants
challenging the Guidelines are that the Guidelines violate the
principle of separation of
powers by requiring the
appointment of three federal
judges to the Commission
and that they constitute an
excessive delegation of leg-
islative powers to the judicial
branch.  
Such defenses were raised
by the defendants in
Gubiensio-Ortiz v. Kanahele,76
who were convicted of vari-
ous unrelated offenses. The
district and appeals courts both agreed.  The Ninth Circuit
held that executive or administrative duties of a non-judicial
nature may not be imposed on judges holding office under
Article III of the Constitution.77 The court determined that the
matters handled by the Commission, including the proper
apportionment of punishment, were peculiarly questions of
legislative policy and that, with the establishment of the
Commission, Congress had effectively delegated legislative
policymaking functions.78 According to the court, these func-
tions are tasks that only the legislative or executive branches,
not the judicial branch, may constitutionally perform.79 This
decision was later vacated by the Supreme Court in U.S. v.
Chavez-Sanchez80 based on Mistretta v. U.S. 81
The Mistretta decision halted all speculation and debate.  In
Mistretta, the Court concluded that, in the creation of the
Sentencing Commission, Congress neither delegated excessive
legislative power nor upset the constitutionally mandated bal-
ance of powers among the coordinate branches.  The Court
found that the functions delegated were non-adjudicatory and
did not trammel the prerogatives of another branch of govern-
ment.82 In the only dissent, Justice Scalia conveyed his con-
cern over the broad discretion given to the Commission to
make value judgments and policy assessments in creating the
Guidelines.83 This case marks the first and the last time that
the Supreme Court has considered an issue that revolves
around the Sentencing Commission or the Guidelines.
B. Due Process
Historically, federal courts have also shown reluctance to
interfere with the type of grant of prosecutorial discretion
involved in the application of the Guidelines.  Most federal
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courts of appeals and district
courts have consistently
upheld the disparity in sen-
tencing between crack and
powder cocaine convictions.
Defendants have argued that
the Guidelines are violative
of due process because
Congress did not give any
legitimate purpose for the
distinctions in crack and
powdered cocaine sentenc-
ing.84 This argument has
generally been deemed invalid due to three justifiable distinc-
tions.  First, courts have determined that crack and powdered
cocaine are two distinct substances and that crack is far more
addictive than cocaine.85 Also, because crack is small in phys-
ical size and inexpensive per dose, other societal problems are
created.86 Last, Congress’s purpose in establishing more strin-
gent punishments for crack convictions was to discourage its
use and distribution.87
The defendants in U.S. v. Davis, however, obtained a rare
victory based on the due process argument in the Northern
District of Georgia.  The defendants both pled guilty to pos-
session of a cocaine base with the intent to distribute.88 The
only asserted challenge was to the constitutionally violative
nature of the Guidelines.89 The court in that case held that the
statute was facially ambiguous because powdered cocaine and
crack are derived from the same substance and have the same
molecular structure, weight, and melting point.  In other
words, the terms “cocaine base” and “cocaine” are synony-
mous.90 The court concluded that the physical form of the
same drug has no rational relationship to any legislative intent
to impose increased penalties that have nothing to do with
potential for abuse.91 Davis was not heard on appeal, but has
subsequently been disagreed with or distinguished in other
decisions of the Northern District of Georgia.92
C. Equal Protection
In federal cases, the Fifth Amendment has been interpreted
to imply an equal protection component forbidding discrimi-
nation that is “so unjustifiable as to be violative of due
process.”93 Crack offense defendants have asserted that the
Guidelines violate the Constitution because they have a dis-
proportionate effect on African-Americans due to the fact that
this racial group is more likely to use and distribute crack than
powdered cocaine.94 The argument has been dismissed based
on the Feeney test, where the Supreme Court held that in order
for a law that is facially neutral to be found unconstitutionally
discriminatory against a racial minority, there must be a find-
ing of discriminatory purpose on the part of the lawmaker.95
The test set forth in Feeney defines discriminatory purpose as
an aspect that implies more than intent as volition or intent as
awareness of consequences.96 According to the Court, dis-
criminatory purpose requires that the decision maker selected
or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part
“because of,” not merely “in spite of,” its adverse effects upon
an identifiable group.97 Feeney adds to the conclusion first set
forth in Washington v. Davis, 98 which stated that dispropor-
tionate impact on a certain group of people is not irrelevant,
but it is not the sole touchstone of an invidious racial discrim-
ination.  Also, the Court has determined that a certain degree
of specificity is required in disproportionate impact challenges.  
In McClesky v. Kemp, 99 the Court held that statistical proof
of discriminatory impact in the administration of the death
penalty was insufficient to show an equal protection violation.
The Court concluded that in order for the defendant to
demonstrate an equal protection violation, he “must prove that
the decisionmakers in his case acted with discriminatory pur-
pose.”100 In general, the courts have repeatedly failed to find
any discriminatory purpose in the legislative history of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, as the disproportionate racial
impact has been deemed a mere consequence of a facially neu-
tral law.  The Guidelines have been measured only by a ratio-
nal basis standard, which means that the state must show
merely a reasonable connection between the statute and its jus-
tification of public welfare.101
Once again, a lone case serves as the antithesis of the gen-
eral rule.  The district court in U.S. v. Clary, 102 held that the
disproportionate penalties for crack cocaine violate equal pro-
tection generally and as applied in the case of the defendant.
The court further held that purposeful discrimination was pre-
sent in the enactment of the law.103 Due to of the novel and
controversial nature of the decision, the court made certain
that every facet of its reasoning was explained in the opinion.
The 18-year-old defendant in Clary was arrested for possession
with intent to distribute 67.76 grams of crack cocaine.104
Clary pled guilty to possession with intent to distribute crack,
a crime punishable by a mandatory minimum sentence of ten
years imprisonment.105 Prior to sentencing, Clary, a black
male, filed a motion challenging the constitutionality of the
Guidelines that pertained to crack cocaine and contended that
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they violated his equal protection rights.  Early in the opinion
the court agreed with Clary’s assertion and recognized that the
sentencing provision for cocaine base “has been directly
responsible for incarcerating nearly an entire generation of
young, black American men for very long periods, usually dur-
ing the most productive time of their lives.”106 The opinion
goes on to provide the reasons why the crack provision of the
Guidelines “shocks the conscience of the Court.”107
The Clary court based its decision on the constitutionally
foundational requirement that persons similarly situated must
be treated alike.108 The opinion first explains that the dispro-
portionate racial effect that results from the crack provision
places the provision in the category of laws that are discrimi-
natory as applied.109 In order to justify this determination, the
court relied on Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Housing Development Corporation.110 In Arlington, the Supreme
Court set out a non-exhaustive list of factors to determine
whether a law was enacted with discriminatory purpose.
These factors include the historical context of the subject mat-
ter, the ultimate effect of the law at issue, any deviation from
standard practice, and the legislative and administrative his-
tory of the particular law.111
With regard to the Arlington factors, the Clary court found
that historically, Congress had been motivated along racial lines
with respect to drug policy.  The court based this finding on
previous United States drug enactments, such as anti-opium
legislation motivated by a notion of the “yellow peril” Far East
military threat of the early 1900s.112 The court also examined
the Harrison Act of 1914, the first federal law to prohibit distri-
bution of cocaine and heroin.  The court relied on evidence that
the Act was passed on the heels of overblown media accounts
depicting heroin-addicted black prostitutes and criminals in the
cities.113 The court found that the author of the Act,
Representative Francis Harrison, moved to include coca leaves
in the bill “since the leaves make Coca-Cola and Pepsi-Cola and
all those things are sold to Negroes all over the South.”114 In
viewing the ultimate effect of the cocaine base provision, the
Clary court found disproportionate impact obvious.  The court
relied on statistics that indicated that 98.2% of defendants con-
victed of crack cocaine charges in the Eastern District of
Missouri between the years 1988 and 1992 were black.115 In
comparison, 45.2% of defendants sentenced for powder cocaine
were white, while 20.7% were black defendants.116
Concerning deviation from standard practice, the court placed
great emphasis on the astoundingly expedient passage of the
legislation that contained the crack provision. The opinion con-
cluded that if such a law had been proposed in relation to pow-
der cocaine, it would have been
much more carefully and delib-
erately considered due to its
inevitable effect of sentencing
droves of young white men to
prison for extended terms.117
In the same context, the court
also considered the biased state-
ments discussed earlier, which
were set forth on the House
floor to gain perspective as to
the legislative history.118 The
court found that in reviewing the factors presented in Arlington,
the crack cocaine provision of the Sentencing Guidelines was
enacted with discriminatory purpose.
In Clary, the court also went on to explain that a new and
equally dangerous breed of racism exists and serves as an addi-
tional motivation for the 100 to 1 crack/cocaine ratio enact-
ment.119 This new breed is “unconscious racism” and, accord-
ing to the court, it has arisen as a result of the myths and fal-
lacies of white superiority, which the nation has been inun-
dated with for centuries.120 The court reasoned that this
notion of superiority has become so deeply embedded in the
white majority that its acceptance and socialization from gen-
eration to generation has become mere routine.121 In the view
of the court,
A benign neglect for the harmful impact or fallout
upon the black community that might ensue from
decisions made by the white community for the
“greater good” of society has replaced intentional dis-
crimination. In the “enlightened and politically cor-
rect 90s,” whites have become indignant at the sug-
gestion that they harbor any ill-will towards blacks or
retain any vestiges of racism. After all, they have black
friends. They work with black people every day. They
enjoy black entertainers on their favorite television
programs every night.122
As a result of its conclusions, the Clary court decided to
impose a sentence in accordance within the range of the
Sentencing Guidelines for powder cocaine, which would be for
21 to 27 months.123 This initial decision, however, was
reversed on appeal.124 The appeals court illustrated tremen-
dous concern at the district court’s reliance on unconscious
racism and found that the assertions offered by the defendant
did not evidence that the crack cocaine provision was enacted
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“because of,” and not merely
“in spite of” discriminatory
purpose.125
D. Cruel and Unusual
Punishment
The final constitutional
argument offered against the
sentencing disparity is that
the Guidelines are cruel and
unusual punishment and
violative of the Eighth
Amendment because the sentencing is unduly severe com-
pared with the crime committed.126 The courts have once
again deemed that substantial deference must be granted to the
broad authority that the legislature necessarily possesses in
determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes.127
However, one district court did find merit in this claim.  In U.S.
v. Walls, defendants Blakney and Campbell were employed as
crack cocaine cookers.128 The two were asked to cook
amounts of powdered cocaine for undercover DEA officers.129
Blakney was paid $100 compensation, while Campbell’s pay-
ment was in the form of a small rock of crack cocaine.130
Blakney faced a mandatory sentence of 10 years and Campbell
faced 20 years.131 Both were drug addicts and it was this con-
dition that led the court to a finding that such sentences would
violate the Eighth Amendment.132
The court’s finding was based on the 1962 Supreme Court
decision of Robinson v. California.133 The Walls court inter-
preted the Robinson holding as stating that criminal punish-
ment of a drug addict on account of his addiction is cruel and
unusual.134 Robinson invalidated a state law that imprisoned a
drug addict as a criminal, even though he had never touched
any narcotic drug within the state or been found guilty of any
irregular behavior there.135 Robinson recognized drug addiction
as an “illness which may be contracted innocently or involun-
tarily.”136 Thus, the Walls court sentenced Blakney and
Campbell in accordance with the ranges prescribed for powder
cocaine offenses: 24 to 30 months in the case of Blakney, and
27 to 33 months for Campbell.  Both were also to be subjected
to six years of probation upon release.137
The United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia determined that Robinson  merely held that the
Eighth Amendment forbids punishing a drug addict merely for
the status of being an addict and that the Eighth Amendment
does not command individualized sentencing and it does not
require consideration of mitigating factors in non-capital
cases.138 Thus, the decision was reversed and remanded for
resentencing.
IV. REFORMS
Judicially, it appears that constitutional challenges to the
Sentencing Guidelines present virtually insurmountable odds
for the crack cocaine offender.  Numerous reform proposals,
however, have been offered in an attempt to halt the devastat-
ing impact inflicted upon minorities by the application of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.  However, reform has been
tempered by a recognition that the Guidelines are likely to
remain intact for some time to come because major legal
reforms are always slow in coming.  In our country, it seems
that reshaping, redirecting, or eliminating any bureaucracy is a
Herculean endeavor.139 The fact that criminal sentencing is a
highly charged political issue in our society implies that reform
in this area will be an even harder task. 
Principal critics of the Guidelines, federal judges, for all
their vaunted independence and high status, are also poorly
positioned and generally unable to influence national legisla-
tive policy.140 The very complexity and intricacy of this large
body of rules easily discourages any observer—policy maker,
legislator, or lay citizen—tempted to take an interest in how
federal crimes are punished.141
This historical reluctance to implement reforms in this area,
which are so badly needed, along with the desire of our
nation’s leaders to pretend that racism and discrimination are
both phenomena of the past, could prove fatal for the
Sentencing Guidelines reform movement. The public percep-
tion of African-Americans as inferior and venal beings has tra-
ditionally provided the basis of acceptability for the most out-
rageous of lies and, in some instances, continues to do so.142
“Progress toward racial equality has been halting, at best.”143
Instead, the nation often seems to be retreating from the values
of a time in which there existed substantial consensus on the
need for racial pluralism in positions of power and for the
opportunity of upward mobility.144 Time is of the essence:
It will be impossible for African Americans to
achieve justice through traditional politics, including
exercising their hard gained franchise.  Perhaps
“impossible” is too strong; it’s better to say that it will
take too long, and African Americans can’t afford to
wait, considering the emergency nature of the crisis.
It will take too long because the only way African
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Americans win in our winner-take-all democracy is to
persuade white people to vote with them.  For matters
of racial justice, that is really tough.  If it took the
white majority more than 200 years to understand
that slavery was wrong, and approximately 100 years
to realize that segregation was wrong (and still many
don’t understand), how long will it take them to per-
ceive that American criminal justice is evil?  And in
the meantime, what should African Americans do?
When one’s house is on fire, should one wait for the
people who set the fire to put it out?145
The criminal justice system places too much emphasis on
punishment and not enough on justice.  The Guidelines are
based on the incorrect premise that incarceration is the only
tough form of punishment.  No one who has ever visited a jail
or  prison and seen fellow human beings locked in cages like
animals can ever be unmindful of the enormity and severity of
society’s decision to deprive one of its members of his or her
liberty.146 The good news is that programs do exist that stop
crime more effectively and that cost less than prison.  The bad
news is that most people, particularly lawmakers, seem not to
care.  An empirical study by the Rand Corporation found that
the best way to prevent crime is to provide financial and health
services to poor children and their families.147 Per dollar
spent, such intervention was shown to prevent more crime
than sending offenders to prison.148 It makes a great deal of
sense.  “If people commit certain kinds of crimes because they
are poor and hopeless, give them money and hope.”149 Until
we, as a society become as eager to provide those things for the
young black population as we are to provide them with jail
cells, reform seems to be nothing more than a distant, wholly
unachievable idea.150
A. Legislative and Executive Reform
The legislature has been granted a tremendous amount of
deference and is viewed as the proper forum for eliminating
the disparity.  In May of 1995, the annual congressional report
of the Sentencing Commission revealed a unanimous agree-
ment among the commissioners that the 100-to-1 ratio is far
too great.151 The Commission balanced statistics that evinced
discrete and substantial harm to minority communities with
the factors that had originally induced the vast ratio, such as
availability of the drug and the harm caused by the sub-
stance.152 In doing so, the Commission determined that the
100-to-1 ratio was unwar-
ranted and, in its report, the
Commission recommended
an amendment to the drug
sentencing guidelines that
would entirely eliminate the
cocaine sentencing dispar-
ity.153 The proposed amend-
ment set sentences for an
offense involving equivalent
amounts of crack cocaine and
powder cocaine at the level currently provided for powder
cocaine.154 Congress rejected the suggested amendment and
directed the commission to recommend further amendments
imposing higher sentences for trafficking in crack cocaine.155
Out of 500 recommendations submitted by the Commission
since its inception, this rejection marked the first time that
Congress overrode the Commission’s advice.156
Since the initial congressional rejection, at least one defen-
dant has attempted to use Congress’s refusal to adjust the ratio
to prove the purposeful discrimination required under Feeney.
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit found in U.S. v. Teague157 that with Congress’s reaffir-
mation of the 100-to-1 ratio, the legislative body simply
decided that the 1-to-1 ratio proposed was inadequate. The
court found no evidence that Congress reaffirmed the ratio “at
least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of’” its adverse
effects upon African-Americans.158
B. Capacity-Based Guidelines
Other proposals for reform include the adoption of rational,
capacity-based sentencing guidelines.  In effect, such guide-
lines would actually impose a sentence proportionate to the
crime committed.  These proposed guidelines would guide
judges in the exercise of their sentencing discretion, not
impose strict, rigid regulations.159 They would also ensure that
the criminal penalties imposed do not exceed the resources
made available to the corrections systems.160 This suggested
system of Guidelines would also include the adoption of a
requirement of  a corrections impact statement, which would
detail the increased number of prisoners predicted and the
prison administration’s capacity to house them.161 The impact
statement would be submitted before any legislation that could
raise the number of people subject to a particular sanction,
such as imprisonment, is ever enacted.162
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C. Drug Court
Yet another proposal is the establishment of a federal drug
court.  By 2000, approximately 450 drug court programs had
been implemented in states throughout the country.163 Drug
courts dispose of criminal cases while providing treatment to
reduce the amount of drug abuse and its related social costs.
They are premised on the assumption that it is infinitely better
to keep a person out of prison, working, and paying taxes, as
opposed to paying $15,000 to $25,000 per year to feed, clothe,
secure, and provide medical care for that person.164
Within the general confines of the drug court program, a
defendant charged with a nonviolent, drug related or drug-
driven felony can elect to plead guilty and enter drug court.
The prosecution must approve the application.  After the guilty
plea is entered, the court defers sentencing and admits the
defendant to a drug treatment program, which is court based,
has three phases, and is expected to last for one full year.165
During the treatment program, the defendant is required to
attend weekly group treatment sessions and meet with a case
manger and treatment counselor for individual review ses-
sions.166 Also, the defendant must submit to frequent drug
testing, attend a prescribed number of Narcotics Anonymous
or Alcoholics Anonymous meetings weekly, and pay the treat-
ment fee of $1,500 a year.167 Another requirement of the pro-
gram is the periodic court appearance ordered by the judge to
verify program compliance.168 The defendant must test drug-
free for a minimum of six months prior to graduation.169
Failure to meet the imposed requirements result in a custodial
prison sentence without the need for further court proceed-
ings.170 Defendants who successfully complete the program
have their guilty plea set aside and their cases dismissed at a
formal graduation ceremony where friends, family, fellow drug
court participants, and the judge are present.171
VI. CONCLUSION
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines were originally created
to produce a more equitable sentencing scheme; however, the
opposite effect has resulted and the Guidelines have become a
major source of societal perpetration of racial inequality.  The
Guidelines have had a devastating effect on the minority pop-
ulation of the United States and the non-relenting, steadily ris-
ing incarceration of minorities serves a purpose of destroying
minority communities by removing members of a certain race,
mainly African-Americans, and isolating them during the most
productive years of their lives.172 The lingering question—
Why should a black drug offender in America receive a different
sentence than a white drug offender?— presents another seem-
ingly obvious answer: He shouldn’t!  The fact that this matter
has not proven to be blatantly obvious to Congress and its leg-
islative agencies should invoke outrage and reform movements
across the nation.  Sadly, both outrage and reform remain mere
aspirations, rather than realizations.  
Six months before his death, former Supreme Court Justice
Thurgood Marshall gave a Fourth-of-July address at
Independence Hall in Philadelphia:
I wish I could say that racism and preju-
dice were only distant memories . . . and that
liberty and equality were just around the
bend.  I wish I could say that America has
come to appreciate diversity . . . .  But as I
look around, I see not a nation of unity but of
division—Afro and white, indigenous and
immigrant, rich and poor, educated and illit-
erate . . . .  But there is a price to be paid for
division and isolation.
. . . .  We cannot play ostrich.  Democracy
cannot flourish amid fear.  Liberty cannot
bloom amid hate.  Justice cannot take root
among rage.  We must go against the prevail-
ing wind. . . .  We must dissent from the fear,
the hatred, and the mistrust.173
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines have created fences of
division that must be knocked down and literal walls of
imprisonment that must be torn apart.  The national legislature
continues to play ostrich and, thus, democracy’s flourish is
hindered amid fear, while liberty’s bloom remains stagnant in
the face of hate.  Society must go against the prevailing wind
and must dissent from the disastrous consequences of the rag-
ing storm created by the Sentencing Guidelines.
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